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PREFACE
This Discussion Paper addresses the objectives and
effectiveness of the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board price
stabilistion scheme introduced in 1975/76, the Supplementary Minimum
Prices (SMP) Scheme introduced by the Government in 1978/79. and the
price stabilisation scheme operated by the New Zealand Pork Marketing
Board during 1977/78. Particular attention is given to the interaction
between the SMP and price stabilisation schemes, and the subsequent
financial implications for the Meat Producers' Board Stabilisation
Accounts. The authors attempt to integrate the discussion of the
specific policy objective and impacts with the longer term and evolving
activities of the statutory marketing authorities in the beef and
sheepmeat, and pig industries.
Thi s project forms part of the AERU research programme
associated with pastoral industry production and policy. Other recent
publications by the Unit in this area include those by R.L. Sheppard
and J.M. Biggs (Discussion Paper No. 63), and M.T. Laing and A.C.
Zwart (Discussion Paper No. 70) on the SMP Scheme; and those by M.T.
Laing and A.C. Zwart (Research Report No. 137) and T.P. Grundy, R.G.
Lattimore and A.C. Zwart (Research Report No. 192) concerning an
econometric model for the New Zealand Pastoral Livestock Sector.
This Discussion Paper was prepared by Dr. G.R. Griffith, a
Visiting Research Fellow with the AERU on leave from the New South
Wales Department of Agriculture, where he is a Senior Research
Scientist in the Division of Marketing and Economics Services, and
Or. S.K. Martin, a Senior Research Economist in the AERU.
A.C. Zwart
Director
(vi i)

SUMMARY
Ouring the 1970's the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board
introduced a buffer fund price stabilisation scheme, and the Government
implemented a pastoral sector Supplementary Minimum Prices scheme. The
schemes were jointly expected to reduce the variability in pastoral
sector farm prices and incomes, reduce the cyclical impact of farm
sector income on the New Zealand economy, expand output and export
revenue, and maintain an adequate income level for agricultural
producers. Considerable debate ensued as to whether these schemes
achieved their stated objectives during the period of operation, and
whether this was done in a cost effective manner.
The SMP scheme was introduced to ensure adequate incomes to
pastoral sector producers and to encourage greater output and export
revenue. It is acknowledged that the scheme suffered severe problems.
First, it was not clear that a strong link existed between farm income
and agricultural investment, so the objectives may not have been
compatible. Second, the operation of the scheme was altered many times
as the Government's perception of a desired adequate income changed.
Rather than introducing a more stable planning and investment
environment in agriculture, these changes may have induced the opposite
effect. Third, some substantial problems existed with the scheme,
including an obvious inconsistency in New Zealand's trade policy stance
and a pattern of prices distorted significantly from market levels
whicn impeded desirable production adjustments.
For the price stabilisation scheme, many of the same problems
existed. Also the overall objective of price stability may not have
been appropriate, and there existed the problem of accurately
forecasting the long run average price to set the price bands. A
natural tendency to set wide bands made the stabilisation scheme less
effective and perhaps encouraged the institution of the SMP scheme.
Perhaps the major criticism of this decade of price
intervention though is the belief of Governments that income objectives
may be achieved through the price system. The large financial losses
of the New Zealand Meat Producers Board during 1981/82 - 1984/85 may
not have occurred if there had not been the obsession with income
adequacy through price supplementation.
the New Zealand pig industry some pressure exists to look
alternative marketing structures including price
and/or support scheliles. The experience of a decade or
pastoral industries, plus a brief and ill-fated encounter
stabilisation in 1977/78, would suggest this should be very
done. With current Government attitudes the industry should
detail the sources of instability and whether the advantages
stability are worth fig~lting for.
In
closely at
stabilistion
more in the
with price
carefully
examine in
of greater
( i x)

SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The past decade has seen the implementation and in many cases
subsequent dismantling of a wide variety of government policies
affecting the New Zealand meat and livestock industries. These
policies include price stabilisation schemes introduced by the New
Zealand Wool Board and the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board in
1975/76; the price stabilisation scheme operated by the NZ Pork
Marketing Board from 1977-1978; the supplementary minimum price scheme
implemented in the wool, meat and dairy industries over the period
1978/79 - 1983/84; and the Livestock Incentive Scheme and the Land
Development Encouragement Loan Scheme. These incentives were
introduced, particularly for sheepmeat, to take advantage of a
relatively favourable world trade outlook and to increase foreign
exchange earnings (Durbin 1985). The introduction and operation of
these schemes has stimulated considerable debate among livestock
producers, other market participants and governm!?nt and academic
personnel. Producers are concerned to know whether such policies
actually stabilise and/or support net returns or stimulate output, and
whether or not the production sector gains from such activities. More
stable prices may also result in more stable output, which has
important implications for the employment of resources in food and
fibre processing, and in transport and other servicing industries, as
well as for the development and maintenance of export markets. On a
more macro level, policies which interfere with the determination of
market prices have some important impacts on national economic welfare
and on the distribution of economic gains and losses among the various
sectors involved.
Although there have been some studies which have attempted to
analyse the SMP scheme in particular (Sheppard and Biggs 1982; Laing
and Zwart 1983), there does not appear to be an overview discussion of
each of the various schemes and an assessment of their major advantages
and disadvantages.
1.2 Aims of the Study
In this paper we have the following objectives:
(a) a short historical overview of the events leading up to the
implementation of these schemes in the mid 1970's;
(b) a more detailed description and discussion of the elements and
operation of the schemes in the beef, sheepmeats and pig
industries, especially in relation to the institutional
structures in these industries and their stated policy
objectives; and
(c) an analysis of the achievements and limitations of the various
schemes.
1
2The focus in this paper is on the meat industries,
discussion of policies in the wool or dairy industries is
Reference to their schemes can be found in Uavidson (1976),
and Biggs (1982), Laing and Zwart (1983), and Martin (1986).
thus any
omitted.
Sheppard
There is also an interesting comparison between the beef and
sheepmeat industries, and the pi g industry, in terms of the hi stori es
of their institutional structures and intervention policies. The beef
and sheepmeat industries have been the subject of statutory marketing
authori ty for many years and have had along hi story of vari ous types
of intervention in their markets. On the other hand, the pig industry
has been predominantly unregulated in market activity and only recently
has statutory authority been sought.
SECTION 2
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
With the exception of the dairy industry. there had been little
price subsidising of New Zealand agriculture up until the mid 1970·s.
There were measures available and sometimes used to assist export
returns in the livestock and wool markets. but little direct production
assistance. This situation caused little comment how~ver. as
international markets were relatively stable and farm gate returns
tended to mirror this stability.
However. during the early 1970·s there were quite severe
fluctuations in the market returns for New Zealand·s livestock
products. First. fuelled by the oil price shocks and the rapid
worl dwi de i nfl ati on ina11 commodi ty pri ces. wool and meat pri ces rose
sharply during 1972/73. Then in late 1974 sharp declines occurred in
the wool and meat industries (see Tables 1 and 2). For beef the real
price fell by two-thirds from 1972/73 to 1974/75. for wool the real
price halved and for mutton the real price fall was over 75 per cent!
Because of the large proportion of agricultural exports in total New
Zealand exports and in national income. these farm price and income
effects were quickly passed through into the rest of the economy. and
prompted the then Labour Government to establish in late 1974 the Farm
Incomes Advi sory Commi ttee (the Zanetti Committee). Thi s Committee had
the following terms of reference:
(i) "to examine ways of reducing the pronounced fluctuations in
prices received by producers of the major agricultural
products;
(ii) to examine ways of achieving a more consistent level of farm
incomes and limiting the disruptive stop-go impact on the New
Zealand economy as a whole. consistent with the need to
maintain over time. the maximum level of returns possible to
producers;
(iii) in light of the above examinations to recommend ways of
reducing the pronounced fluctuations in product prices.
consistent with the need to maintain market orientation of
agricultural production in New Zealand. and the incentive and
ability to respond to trends in overseas agricultural policies
and prices".
3
4Table 1: Nominal Price Trends for ~ew Zealand Livestock Products,
1964/65
-
1986/87
------._----_.,-~. ---".~- .~.._.,,---
_N_._______
Year Pr'ime Manufafituring Lambe Ivtuttone Woolf IVlil kfat<:J
Beefa Beef
(c/kg) (e/ku) (c/kg) (e/kg) (c/kg) (c/kg iVIF)
1964/65 33.1 22.9 43.8 17.9 77.40 76.86
1965/66 34.6 30.9 40.8 17.6 76.46 81.23
1966/67 33.3 28.2 33.1 16.1 64.77 81.39
1967/68 39.1 36.2 40.2 16.3 53.84 74.75
1968/69 42.4 37.6 48.9 17 .3 61.89 71.16
1969/70 52.0 49.6 44.3 23.3 56.'S3 71.90
1970/71 53.8 47.2 42.1 16.5 ~3.69 85.77
1971/72 52.2 42.6 39.1 14.1 66.70 120.87
1972/73 75.0 62.2 70.2 53.2 143.96 115.65
1973/74 59.7 41.4 71.3 41.4 139.19 127.58
1974/75 36.5 26.0 56.0 15.0 92.82 127.03
1975/76 57.9 45.9 75.0 30.9 159.52 140.81
1976/77 62.4 50.6 100.4 53.1 206.61 152.74
1977 /78 65.5 55.6 93.9 43.7 190.43 167.35
1978/79 111.6 101.3 111.6 55.4 21B.8S 18U.OU
1979/80 120.2 103.3 120.3 ':>7.7 265.09 208.00
198U/81 120.2 105.0 124.3 63.0 247.71 265.00
1981/82 143.0 125.0 166.2 54.7 312.08 333.48
1982/83 163.8 136.9 169.5 65.2 312.19 36U.75
1983/84 181.2 143.0 178.5 71.U 318.U6 350.00
1984/85 232.8 2UO.0 258.5d 146.6d 377 .43 396.UU
1985/86 173.0 139.8 183.4d 77.3d 343.82 400.0U
1986/87 182.5 139.1 251.8d 126.3d 416.70 320.00
Sources: NZ Dairy Board Annual Report (various issues)
NZ Wool Board Annual Report (various issues)
NZ Meat Producers' Board Annual Report (various issues)
NZ Meat and Wool Board Economic Service Annual Review of
the Sheep and Beef Industry (various issues)
a Average of mid-month farm gate schedule prices, North Island,
January to June, plus or minus any supplements or levies
b Average of mid-month farm gate schedule prices, North Island,
February to June, plus or minus any supplements or levies
c Average of mid-month farm gate schedule prices, North Island,
December to May, plus or minus any supplements or levies, plus wool
and pelt values
d now quoted on ex-scales basis and not comparable to previous years
e Average of mid-month farm gate schedule prices, North Island,
January to June, plus or minus any supplements or levies, plus wool
and pelt values
f Average auction price, new clip, greasy wool ex store, July-June,
plus or minus any supplements or levies.
g Basic payment plus end of season distribution.
5Table 2: Real Price Trends for New Zealand Livestock Products,
1964/65 - 1986/87
Year
1964/65
1965/66
1966/67
1967/68
1968/69
1969/70
1970/71
1971/72
1972/73
1973/74
1974/75
1975/76
1976/77
1977 /78
1978/79
1979/8U
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
Prim~
Beef
(e/kg)
77.7
79.2
74.0
83.9
88.1
104.8
103.5
94.4
129.1
YO.O
48.5
68.7
62.4
56.7
88.5
77.8
63.3
64.3
66.9
73.8
86.1
56.6
55.4
Manufa~turing
Beef
(e/kg)
53.8
70.7
62.7
77.7
78.2
100.0
90.8
77 .0
107.1
62.4
34.6
54.4
50.6
48.1
80.3
66.9
55.3
56.2
55.9
58.2
74.0
45.7
42.3
(c/kg)
102.8
93.4
73.6
86.3
101.7
89.3
81.0
70.1
120.8
107.5
74.5
89.0
100.4
81.2
88.5
77 .9
65.5
74.8
69.2
72.7
95.6c
60.0c
76.5c
Muttona
(c/kg)
42.0
40.3
35.8
35.0
36.0
47.0
31.7
25.5
91.6
62.4
19.9
36.7
53.1
37.8
43.9
37.4
33.2
24.6
26.6
28.9
54.2c
25.3c
38.4c
Wool a
(c/kg)
181.7
175.0
143.9
115.5
128.7
114.0
103.3
120.6
247.8
209.9
123.4
189.2
206.6
164.7
173.6
171. 7
130.4
140.4
127.5
129.6
139.6
112.4
126.6
Mil kfatb
(e/kg MF)
184.8
191.6
185.8
164.3
152.4
146.7
164.0
220.6
195.0
185.7
164.3
160.0
152.7
146.4
140.0
134.4
133.6
154.1
151.3
144.7
149.2
138.6
111.5
Sources and definitions of raw data in Table 1
a Deflated by Prices Paid by Sheepfarmers Index (Base 1977=1.0),
calendar year, from NZ Meat and Wool Board Economic Service, Annual
Review of the Sheep and Beef Industry (various issues)
b Deflated by Prices Paid by Dairy Farmers Index (Base 1977=1.0),
April-tvlay, from NZ Dairy Board Farm Production Report (various
issues)
c Now quoted on an ex-scale basis and not comparable to previous
years
6This Committee sUbsequently reported in March 1975 recommending:
(i) the setting of a basic price at the beginning of the season
based on a moving average of recent net market returns. The
difference between the basic price and market price is to be
paid as a deficiency payment, or collected as a levy as a
debit or credit to a buffer account. The scheme being in
essence, self-funding.
(i 1) The establishment of criteria for deciding when
Government-funded supplementary payments are necessary to
maintain an adequate income level.
However, the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries considered
that a price stabilisation scheme operated by the Meat and Wool Boards
would meet both objectives by stabilising farm prices at a market
related level sufficient to provide for an adequate level of income.
The Government had already granted $50 M to the meat and wool
industries in 1974/75 to support prices. Following negotiations
between Government and the Producer Boards, agreement was reached on
the implementation of price stabilisation schemes to be administered by
the Producer Boards. Consequently, legislation was introduced which
brought into existence, late in the 1975/76 season, price stabilisation
schemes in the meat and wool sectors (See Section 3.2).
Following the operation of these schemes over the 1975/76 to
1977/78 seasons, the Government considered that the Government
objective of income adequacy had not been achieved by the schemes. As
a result, the Supplementary Minimum Prices (SMP) Scheme was introduced
at the beginning of the 1978/79 season (see Section 3.3). At least
part of the rationalisation for SMP's was that they were made to
pastoral farmers to compensate for Government policies which resulted
in "... the overvalued exchange rate and high internal costs facing the
farmer" (Taylor and Davidson 1986, p.3.). The SI"lP Scheme got into
serious difficulties in the early 1980's, however when SMP's were set
at high levels in a depressed international market environment that was
caused to some extent by substantial increases in New Zealand output
via the production incentive schemes. Government payments expanded
rapidly until the Scheme was dissolved in 1983/84, although
transitional payments were still made throughout 1984/85. Over the
past two years other government assistance to the livestock industries
has also been reduced or removed, and these are also detailed in
following sections.
SECTION 3
THE MUTTON, LAMB AND BEEF INDUSTRIES
This quite lengthy Section commences with a chronological
account of the changes in the market environment and statutory
institutional activities in the beef and sheepmeat industries over the
period 190U to the present. Attention is focussed on the changing role
of the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board. Then follows a description
of the justification for and elements of the Board's Price
Stabilisation Scheme and the Government's Supplementary Minimum Price
Scheme, and an account of the implementation of the various Schemes
over the period 1975/76 to 1984/85. The impact of the various Schemes
on pastoral sector prices received and output, and on the financial
committments of the Meat Producers' Board, are clearly obvious.
3.1 The Market Environment and Statutory Institutional Activities 1
3.1.1. Prior to 1921
Statutory involvement in the export sector of the New Zealand
meat industry (mutton, lamb and beef) began with the Slaughtering and
Inspection Act 1900, which provided for the establishment of abattoirs
and the licensing of meat export slaughterhouses having sanitary
conditions of slaughter.
Until 1915, a free enterprise system of marketing operated in
the meat industry. However, pri ce fa 11 sin tne domi nant United Ki ngdom
market in 1909 led to industry attempts in New Zealand to form a
regulatory marketing institution, but the proposals were defeated.
For a fi lie year peri od from 1915 to 1920, a11 meat avail ab1e
for export from New Zealand was purchased by the United Kingdom
Government under the Imperial Commandeer. This meant a secure
protected market for producers, where all export meat was sold at fixed
prices.
3.1.2. 1921 to 1939
The return to free enterprise marketing in 1921 coincided with
two season's production arriving on the United Kingdom market. This
led to low prices, which, along with rising production and shipping
costs, led to falling net returns and to renewed calls for statutory
intervention in the market.
As a result of these pressures, the Meat Export Control Act
1921-1922 was passed. This led to the establishment of the New Zealand
Meat Producers' Board, which appeared to have the power to control
exports, to approve export slaughtering facilities, to act as sole
agent in negotiating shipping contracts, and to organise grading,
pooling, storage, disposal, insurance and advertising of New Zealand
export meat. Its primary objective was to increase returns to
1 This section is sun~arised from Martin (1986)
1
8producers, and its operations were to be financed by a levy charged on
all exported meat. This Act., subject to Amendments subsequent to 1922,
remains in force at present.
The Board did not exercise its apparent authority to export
\i;;,:'ilt initially, and major marketing functions continued to be carried
out oy rrivate firms with the Board adopting only a surveillance or
"watch do'];; attitude toward the slaughter and export of meat. It did,
however, undertake the other activities for which it was authorised.
During the Depression, market prices for meat were low, and, in
the latter half of the 1930's, quotas on meat imports into the United
Kingdom were in force in an attempt to influence price in that market.
This economic climate led to suggestions of greater intervention in the
meat industry, first with the 1934 Agricultural (Emergency Powers) Act,
and then wi th the 1936 Pri mary Products l~arketi ng Act (not acti vated
with respect to meat products initially).
In 1939, the Meat Act was passed, which superseded the 1900
Act, and in addition to hygiene, introduced economic criteria for
approving applications for the extension of export works. The
successors to this 1939 Act, along with the 1922 Meat Export Control
Act and the successors to the 1955 Meat Export Prices Act, provide the
current statutory authority to intervene in the meat industry.
3.1.3. 1939 to 1954
With the outbreak of war, the 1936 Primary Products Marketing
Act was invoked and the marketing of export meat, under the bulk
purchase agreement with the United Kingdom, became the responsibility
of the Primary Products Marketing Department. This reduced the Board's
activities to the supervision of grading and maintaining a surveillance
role on slaughtering costs on behalf of producers, in an effort to
maintain producer returns. At the conclusion of the war, the bulk
service contract was extended until 1954, and in 1948, the Board took
over the administration of the agreement.
In the early years of the contract, price increases were
negotiated with the United Kingdom Government. The Primary Products
Marketing Department then paid a fixed f.o.b. contract price to
exporters, who in turn paid producers the corresponding schedule price.
However, in the early years, these were not fully returned to
producers. Instead, as part of the Government's economic stabilisation
policy measures, increases in price were credited to the Meat Industry
Stabilisation Account (later renamed the Meat Industry Reserve
Account). This account continued to accumulate reserves, thereby
resulting in producer dissatisfaction, and from the early 1950's no
further price increases were paid into it. It was then used to make
loans to fertiliser, meat processing and topdressing companies.
3.1.4. 1954 to 1971
From the conclusion of the bulk purchase contract until the
1970's, export meat marketing remained in the hands of private
enterprise, with the Board maintaining its overseeing role of schedule
monitoring and advising producers to sellon own account or through the
pools if it felt the meat exporters' schedule was unrealistic. This
9monitoring and advisory role was designed to influence export prices,
by precluding monopolistic exploitation of producers by meat exporters.
Towards the end of the bulk purchase agreement, the Board began
to press for minimum prices for export meat which would utilise the
meat industry reserve funds. This led to the Meat Export Prices Act
1955, which resulted in prices being set pre-seasonally oy\, a Meat
Export Pri ces Committee. Criteri d used when setti n9 prices \Vere
previous prices, market prospects, other farm costs, and the cost of
living index. The scheme was envisaged as a deficiency payments
scheme, rather than as a price stabilisation scheme, but prices were
thought to be increased by its operation.
Our; ng thi s peri od the tl'\eat Export Development Company (NZ)
Ltd, or Devco, was set up under the 19L2 Act and was given the sole
rights to market frozen sheepmeat to the North American market. During
the 1960's, the financial losses of Devco generated considerable
controversy. However, it appears that the divers'ion of supply from the
United Kingdom to the North American market resulted in a strengthening
of UK prices (Edwards, 1970).
A further attempt to accelerate the diversification of exports
and boost overall returns to producers was made with the 1966 Amendment
to the Meat Export Control Act, which constituted a Market Development
Committee to set di vers ifi cati on targets for 1amb exports.
Diversification penalties and bonuses were introduced to encourage
individual companies to attain targets. This scheme was eventually
discontinued in 19~u.
Under the
licences only on
whereby licencees
and, if necessary,
offerer1s behalf.
Meat Act 1964, export slaughter-houses were
the condition that they adopt an open-door
were obliged to process all stock offered
to arrange for the marketing of the meat
granted
pol icy,
to them
on the
The Board also supported research activities
period, and in conjunction with the Freezing Companies
financed the establishment of the Meat Research Institute.
3.1.5. 1971 to 1982
duri ng thi s
Association,
The 1970's marked a period of selective intervention by the
Board in the market to force up prices. The first occasion was in
1911, when the Board responded to a low opening lamb schedule by
entering the market to trade in lamb. It did so with the authority of
a 1971 Amendment to the 1922 Act, which overrode previous amendments,
and explicitly allowed the Board to sell sheepmeats in any market.
This authority was extended in 1974 to cover beef and veal.
Since then, the Board has intervened in the market on a number
of oeedsi ons duri n9 market downturns. In 1974, it offered its own
schedules for beef, ewe and lamb, which it was then able to increase
and to guarantee for another season with the assistance of Government
who established a Meat Income Stabilisation Account with an initial
grant. This account was to be administered by the Board Late in
19/5, the Board again intervened, thi s time in themitton inarket. ThE;
next occasion was in 1917 in the London market, where the Board
1()
purchased carcasses for resale later in the season under the auspices
of Meatmark Ltd. It also intervened in the mutton market in the next
season.
uuring tnis period, the board also consolidated its powers to
control the conditions of exports to specific destinations. A 1975
Amendment to the 1964 Meat Act give the Board power to impose
conditions on meat exporters' licences, such as limitations on meat
type and destination, with the aim of assisting orderly marketing,
increasing prices and reducing costs. This amendment was then used to
restrict the number of exporters in the West German lamb market. In
19tiO, it signed a contract with Iran, and then appointed one exporter
to manage this contract.
Changes in the minimum prices scheme also occurred in the
1970's. In 1976, through an updated Meat Export Prices Act, this
scheme was transformed from a pure deficiency payment scheme to one
with deficiency payment and stabilisation aspects (see Section 3.2).
The criteria under which minimum prices were set were widened, and, in
additior a trigger price was set, above which levies were imposed.
These wer~ to be used to offset supplements payable when the market
price was below the minimum price, as the industry reserves were no
longer available for supplementation. A further dimension to the
Board's stabilisation activities was added in 1978, when it found
itself required to administer the Government's supplementary minimum
prices scheme (see Section 3.3).
Further developments in the freezing sector of the industry
occurred in 1981, with tne passage of another Meat Act, which
delicensed the industry. This allowed slaughtering facilities to be
freely established, subject to open-door arrangements.
3.1.6. 1982 to 1986
The sheepmeats industry faced a difficult year in 1982 (see
Durbin [1985J for a concise review of sheepmeat issues over this
period). As a reSUlt, the Board intervened in the mutton market and
eventually bought up 90 per cent of the season's kill in order to
arrest the fall in prices to producers. Later in the season, the lamb
schedule fell, and various intervention measures were taken including
the Board taking responsibility for high-risk product, and reactivating
Meatmark Ltd.
As the crisis in the industry deepened, a Meat Industry Task
Force was set up to enquire into the system of meat marketing. The
Task Force stressed a greater emphasis on a marketing approach, and
recommended that the Board act as the primary exporter of carcasses and
primal cuts, and the setting-up of a Meat Industry Council to formulate
an industry strategic plan and to formulate and monitor annual
marketing plans with the Board. In the meantime, the Board had
purchased all sheepmeats that season at a schedule based on
Supplementary Minimum prices. This essentially reduced the exporters'
role to that of commission agents for the Board. Market realisations
in 198J were so low that support levels for meat prices were a record.
The
Task Force
Board then implemented the proposals of the Meat Industry
and refined earlier proposals to establish an export pool
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system of payment for sheepmeats under Board control. It initially
assumed responsioility for the carcass and primal cut segment of the
market, although after a short period, it then decided that lamb
carcasses and primal cuts to be sold to specific regions would be
handled by a group marketing structure (NZ Meat Producers· Board
1985a).
Also in line with the Task Force recommendations, the Board
placed increasing emphasis on product development and promotion as
components in its more market-led strategy. It continued its
cost-reducing activities, with reviews of shipping costs and grading.
Despite this experiment in Board control, it became obvious at
the beginning of the 1985/86 season that the international sheepmeats
market was very depressed and the Board announced correspondingly low
prices to producers. However, at this time, the Board·s trading
operations were subject to criticism by the meat exporting companies,
and to pressure by the Government to return to private enterprise
marketing. Therefore, in late 1985, the Board announced its intention
to hand the marketing of sheepmeats back to the private meat exporters.
This has resulted in a substantial scaling down of Board activity in
the sheepmeat market. The evolution of statutory behaviour in the meat
industry is su~narised in Table 3.
3.Z The NZ Meat Producers· Board Price Stabilisation Scheme 2
The sharp decline in the income of the meat and wool industry
during the 1974/75 season (see Tables 1 and 2) prompted the Government
to grant the sectors $50m to support prices. The sum was transferred
to Stabilisation Accounts for the meat and wool sectors and these
accounts were to form the ba sis of longer term Industry Pri ce
Stabilisation schemes. The NZ Meat Producers· Board received $35m of
the grant and paid $25m on lamb supplements and $32.8m on beef
supplements. The deficiency in the Government grant was met by the
Board. The Board was also required to continue its supplementation of
beef prices during the 1975/76 season paying over $llm to beef
producers from reserve funds.
During the 1~75/76 season, new price stabilisation schemes were
introduced by the Meat and Wool Boards which formalised the previous
arrangements.
The NZ Meat Producers· Board Price Stabilisation Scheme only
applied to stock slaughtered for export. A Meat Export Prices
Committee comprising an independent chairman, and two Meat Board and
two Government representatives, was responsible for setting minimum and
maximum (trigger) prices for the benchmark grades of meat, at the start
of the season after consultation with the Minister of Agriculture and
Fisheries.
Four grades of meat were defined as benchmark grades, as they
were considered to be representative of the market. These were Lamb
(PM, 13-16 kg), Mutton (ML 22 kg and under), Prime Beef (PI, 245.5-270
kg) and Manufacturing Beef (Cow M, 145.5-170 kg). A fifth benchmark
grade, Bull Beef (220.5-245 kg), was added in the 1979/80 season. The
minimum and trigger prices (as defined below) set for each of these
grades were reflected in all other export grades of each category
according to their "normal market" price relativities.
2 This section and the next are drawn from Sheppard and Biggs (1982)
Table 3: Activities by Statutory Marketing Authorities in the Meat
Industry
New Zealand Meat
Producers· Board
(NZMPB)
1923 - 1939
Negotiate
marketing cost
reductions
Enforcing
grading system
Promotion
Regul ating meat
shipments
Collecting levies
Primary Products
Marketing Dept
1939 - 1948
NZMPB 1948 - 1954
As for NZMPB
1923 - 1939
Bulk purchase
negotiations
Setting export
prices
NZfrlPB
1954 - 1971
As for NZI~PB
1923 - 1939
Supply
diversion
Schedule
monitoring
Enforcing
open door
policy
Price support
through
minimum
pri ces
NZI~PB
1971 - 1982
As for I~ZI'~PB
1923 - 1939
Selective
market
intervention
Market
diversifi-
cation
(Uelicensing
of the
freezing
industry
occurred)
Schedule
monitoring
Pri ce support
through
minimum prices
and selective
intervention
NZMPB
1982 - 1985
Control of all
sheepmeat
marketing
Increased
market
segmentation
Increased
promotion
Continued
attempts to
reduce
marketi ng
costs
NZMPB
1985 -
(Sheepmea t-
marketing
handed back
to private
enterprise)
Promotion
Encouraging
mutual
co-operation
by exporters
I-'
N
Source: Adapted from Martin (1986)
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The Committee, in estab1i shi ng the n11 n1 mum pri ces for each
benchmarK grade, had certain rules to follow. The minimwn price
determined had to be within a 10 per cent deviation of an average price
calculated from the weighted average of the actual market price of the
preceding year and the estimated market prices for the current and
forthcoming season. The Committee had also to consider the existing
price levels and market prospects for various types of meat and other
farm products; the desirability of expanding the production of meat in
New Zealand; and the balance of the Meat Income Stabilisation Account.
In setting trigger prices, the Committee had to consider
existing price levels and market prospects for meat and farm products;
the desirability of maintaining a sufficient margin above the minimum
price to allow for normal marketing; the balance of the Meat Income
Stabilisation Account; and any other matters considered relevant by
the Committee.
Individual commodity accounts for sheep and beef meats were
established within the Meat Income Stabilisation Account held at the
Reserve Bank. Tne Reserve Bank provided an overdraft facility if
necessary. initially at a charge of one per cent per annum, and paid
interest on deposits at the same rate. These accounts were
supplemented by the collection of levies and drawn on if supplementary
payments are made. It was intended that the accounts be self-balancing
over time.
The Scneme only operated when the lowest regional schedule
price, as announced for the week by the Meat Board, of a benchmark
grade was below the minimum price set by the Committee for the season.
If this occured the Meat Board was required to determine minimum prices
for all grades of meat in the category. The Board then may have
intervened directly in the market and purchased at the minimum price,
or supplemented the schedule price to the extent nece;;..:.;ary to increase
it to the minimum price, or undertaken a combination of intervention
and supplementation.
When the lowest regional schedule price of a benchmark grade
exceeded its trigger price, a levy was imposed on grower returns for
all grades represented by the benchmark grade at a rate equivalent to
50 per cent of the excess over the trigger price.
The Scheme was effectively terminated at the end of the 1984/85
season as the ~oard could not offer realistic minimum prices because of
the huge deficits in the Stabilisation Accounts and the requirement
that future overdrafts could only be obtained at market interest rates.
3.3 The Supplementary IVlinimum Price Scheme
The recommendations of the Zanetti Committee included the need
for income adequacy as well as price stabilisation.
As already discussed, the Board assumed responsibnity fOf t,·""
implementation and administration of the price stab1'isatlon scheme,
but dec1 ared tnat it was II a Government respons i bi. i ty to ensure
producers an adequate income after consultation with the Producer
Boards". (ILl. l'4eat Producers' Board 1975, p.28).
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The operation of the stabilisation schemes over the 1975/76,
1976/77 and 1971/78 seasons had been vi ewed with concern by Government.
It had been anticipated that the schemes would provide for both the
stabilisation of farm product prices and the achievement of an adequate
level of farm income based on market returns. In the opinion of the
Government, neither of these objectives had been met over the three
years of stabilisation scneme operation and it was therefore decided
that a new scheme should be introduced with the objectives of improved
stabilisation and farm income adequacy.
In the 1978 Budget, the Government expressed the opinion that
there was a considerable need to induce a higher level of confidence in
the agricultural sector. It was expected that such confidence would
result in an expansion of output and so lead to continued growth irl the
export earnings from the agricultural sector. The Minister of Finance
stated that the most appropriate remedy to the problem was to guarantee
to farmers "prices for primary products which will give them a more
adequate return for their efforts" (flJZ Government 1978, p.16), and that
this was to be achieved by establishing and underwriting new minimum
prices to supplement those operated by the various Producer Boards.
Tne t~i ni ster expressed the vi ew that these Supplementary Mi ni mum Pri ces
(SMPs) would more adequately provide for farmers' reasonable
requirements for living expenses, farm operating expenditure and new
development than the Producer Boards' schemes. It was hoped that in
setting the minimum prices for two years ahead, rather than the single
season orientation of the Producer Board schemes, the farmer would have
an assured and realistic base on wnich to plan.
It was announced that the Boards would administer the scheme
using Government funds. These funds, drawn in the event of market
prices falling below the SMP would be provided temporarily from Reserve
Bank overdraft and ultimately from Government revenue. The scheme was
not designed to be self-balancing and was to be "no more than an
interim measure". The desirability of changing the present structure
of the price smoothing arrangements was also stressed by the Minister.
A much bri efer comment was made by the tvli ni ster in the 1979
Budget: "The guaranteed prices will be moved closer to next season's
expected market levels, and the scheme will continue to operate in
parallel with the minimum prices scheme and price smoothing
arrangements operated by the Producer Boards." (NZ Government 1979,
p.12). This suggests that the emphasis had moved from the original
idea of providing income adequacy to farmers, and been replaced by a
slightly more market orientation designed to protect the farmer from
short term price recessions. The Government claimed that the
successful introduction of the Supplementary lvlinimum Prices Scheme had
meant that farmers could plan and invest to increase production knowing
in advance the minimum prices they will receive for the next two
seasons, and that this knowledge should allow the agricultural sector
to "play its full part in generating export-led growth".
A reaffirmation of the Government's intention to merge the SMP
scheme with the Board's price smoothing arrangements was also made in
the 1979 Budget, but no indication was given as to the form of the
final package. The l~inistry of Agriculture and Fisheries expressed the
view (i4AF 1~79, p.ll) that a likely arrangement would involve the
continuance of the Producer Boards' schemes, with minimum prices being
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set at "realistic" levels, and the Government assuming responsibility
for support in the event of major price recessions of the magnitude of
the beef price slump in 1974 or the drop in wool prices in 1974/75.
The cautious interpretation of the role of the SMP scheme
continued in the 1980 Budget announcement with the Government
indicating that the SMP scheme was more intended to provide a
guaranteed price to farmers for a two year period rather than including
any menti on of income adequacy. However, thi s movement was reversed
with the announcement of prices for the 1981/82 and 1982/83 seasons
when, in the 1981 Budget, the Government moved well ahead of the market
price levels in the setting of the Supplementary Minimum Prices. This
shift in interpretation can perhaps be seen as a Government return
towards the income adequacy orientation of the SMP scheme. Although
income adequacy had been announced by the Government in 1978 to be one
of the objectives of the SMP scheme, it was apparently ignored in
subsequent budgets, in favour of price stability objectives, until the
1981 announcements.
No changes were made to SMPs for the 1983/84 season, and the
scheme was terminated at the close of that season, although
transitional arrangements for sheepmeats were negotiated.
3.4 Operation of the Two Schemes
3.4.1. Lamb
Over the period from 1975/76 to 1980/81 the Meat Producers'
Board stabilistaion scheme for lamb was largely ineffective. With the
exception of a short period early in the 1979/80 season and early in
the 1980/81 season, the stabilisation scheme minimum price was below
the market price (Figure 1). Also apart from Oecember 1976, the
trigger price had not been exceeded by the market price. During the
period, reasonably large fluctuations occurred in the schedule price
for lamb, especially in DecemDer 1976, October 1978 and February 1980
and the stabilisation scheme had minimal impact.
The introduction of the SMP scheme at the beginning of the
1978/79 season had very little impact on the prices received by
farmers. Although the SMP was well above the previous season's minimum
price, the Board minimum price (based on market criteria) exceeded the
SMP. In the following season, the real level of SMP was maintained but
this was matched by the Board minimum price. In the 1980/81 season,
the Board minimum price again exceeded the SMP. The real increase in
the minimum price was five per cent while the SMP rose by three per
cent. Again, neither the minimum price nor the SMP had any impact of
producer returns as schedule prices remained on or above their level
(Table 4 and Figure 1).
For the 1981/~2 season, however, the SMP was raised by nine per
cent in real terms, and thi s was well above the current market returns
and some 29 cents kg above the largely unaltered Board minimum price.
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Table 4: Sheepmeats Schedule, Stabilisation and Supplementary
Minimum Prices, 1975/76 - 1986/87 (c/kg)
Stabilisation Prices
Product Year Supplementary
Category Ended Minimum Trigger Minimum l'~arket
September Price Price Price Price#
Lamb 1976 49.5 57.7
1977 55 72 68.1
1978 59 78 69.4
1979 72 95 70 80.6
1980 86 120 86 95.8
1981 113 155 110 116.0
1982 116 160 145 132.2
1983 114 153 146 148.5
1984 99 155 146 148.5
1985 173* 223* 202.5*
1986 100* 223* 138.7*
19tH 1* 310* 159.2*##
IVlutton 1976 22 22.8
1977 21 30 39.5
1978 30 40 34.3
1979 30.5 42 30 39.6
19~0 35 50 40 44.0
19tH 40 60 43 54.6
1982 43 65 50 45.8
1983 42 63 51 50.0
1984 12 52 51 50.5
1985 64* 112* 105.5*
1986 25* 112* 55.5*
1987 1* 162* 77 .8*##
Sources: Sheppard and Biggs (1982); NZ Meat Producers' Board (1985)
* now quoted on an ex freezer basis and not comparable with
previous years
## to June 19~7
# the monthly schedule prices are provided in Appendix
Tables Al and A2
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After several unsuccessful attempts to stabilise the price of
1amLi the Board offered its own schedul es in Apri 1 1982 to purchase the
remainder of the seasons kill at the minimum price. Supplementary
payments on lamb during this season exceeded $153.5M, including $93.9M
in SfvlP payments dnd the remainder from the Meat Income Stabilisation
Account as trading losses.
For 1982'83 both SI'IP and Board 101 n1 mum pri ces were 1ittl e
changed frrnn the previous year, with the SMP for lamb some 32 cents
higher'. Exporters could not match the Board's minimum price, so it was
agreed with exporters and the Government that the Board would sell the
sheepmeat using the traditional exporters as commission agents. The
Board purchased all 1amb at tne SI"1P wi th the Government payi ng the 32
cents/kg aifference between the SMP and the Board's minimum price or
some $1451~. The deficit of market returns under the minimum price came
out of the Stabilisation Account. A similar situation held in 19~3/84
with SMP's unchanged but the minimum price reduced, so that the SMP now
exceeded the minimum by 47 cents/kg. Again all lamb was purchased by
the Board and the 47 cent difference under the ~MP, which totalled some
$2131"1 or $6.40 per head, was paid by the Government. Another large
loss was added to the Stabilisation Account as well.
Uuring 19~3/84 agreement was reached on dismantling the SMP
scheme for meats on September 30, 1984. It was to be replaced for one
year by a grant equal to an estimate of the amount which would have
been paid if SMP had been continued. An amount of $110M was set as the
lump sum for 1984/85. Further, ttle interest rates payable or
receivable on the Stabilisation Accounts during and following 1984/tl5
was raised from one per cent to ten per cent, and the overdraft on the
Stabilisation Account was converted to a sUbordinated loan to be
repaid over 30 years with a five year repayment holiday.
In 1984/85 the rapidly increasing deficits in the Stabilisation
Account and the problem of haVing to pay market interest rates led the
Board to set very low minimum prices. The Board operated a system of
national pools for export sheepmeat. Farmers received an advance
payment from the national grade pools and a supplement from the lump
sum, which had been increased to $131.7M. Lamb prices required
supplementation all year and some 19.5 c/kg or $2.50/head was paid out.
This totalled $93.8M.
For 1985/86 meat companies operated their own sheepmeat
schedules from December 21. Producers had the Choice of accepting the
SChedule price as total payment, or marketing through company pools
where they would receive an advance payment of about 90 per cent of the
ruling schedule with the possibility of receiving an end of pool
payment if a surplus was achieved.
3.4.2. ~lutton
The Board stabilisation prices for mutton had more effect than
those for lamb. The trigger price was effective during the 1976/77
season (and briefly in the 1977/78 season) and again during the 197~/79
season (Figure 2). Also, during the 1977/78 season, the minimum price
reduced the fall in farm gate prices through the Board acquiring mutton
at the minimum price. Until 19~0/81, neither the trigger price nor the
minimum price had been effective in reducing the price fluctuations
that occurred.
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The ~MP announced for the 1978/79 season was matched the
Board mni mum pri ce find therefore the SMP di d not have any i,',ipact on
the prices received. The SMP for the 1979/80 season was increased by
n le :ent in real terms. This was close to, but below, market
nr1<:"'s ('OI.igh:\';"t trle season, A small increase was made for the
)8u/81 ;)easo, out market pr'ices Y"emained well above the SrvlP level.
The SMP announced for 1981/82 was significantly raised and above both
minimum prices and ruling marKet price levels (Table 4).
With the nlgh likelihood of extensive supplementation, the
Boara would only agree to pay supplements at levels above the minimum
price and since exporters could not set scned111es matching the minimum
prices, the Board issued its own schedule early in the season.
tventually they assumed ownership of over 90 per cent of the season's
mutton production. The Government paid aDout ~M.7M on the 7c/kg
difference between the SMP and the minimum price, and the Board had a
loss of around $25M on mutton trading. In 1982/83 a similar situation
occurred with SMP and Board minimum prices little changed; the Board
purchasing all mutton at the SMP level; the Government paying the
9c/kg suppl ement or $12M; and the Board payi ng the defi cit on mutton
trading from the Stabilisation Account. The total loss on lamb and
mutton trading for this season was almost $28MM.
The procedure was repeated in 1983/84 with SMP unchanged but
the minimum price reduced to only 12 c/kg. Thus the Government was
required to supplement $48M (39c/kg or $7.60 per head), while the Board
activities resulted in a trading loss on both lamb and mutton of over
$150M. Further support was required in 1984/85 of $38M (31.5c/kg or
$4.60 per head) from the lump sum payment by Government.
With both the SMP and Board stabilisation scheme being
effectively terminated at the end of the 1984/85 season, significant
falls in price paid to producers resulted. Durbin (1985) reports one
estimate of a 50 per cent fall in works door return per lamb.
The market, stabil i sati on and supplementary mi ni mum pri ces for
sheepmeat are provided in Figures 1 and 2, and in Table 4. The results
of the operation of the stabilisation scheme for sheepmeat are reported
in TaDle 5, while payments to producers under the SMP scheme are given
in Table 6.
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Table"5: Meat Income Stabilisation Account, 1974/75 - 1984/85
Sheep Meats Sub Account ($/m)
Year
Ended
September 1975 1976 1977 197~ 1979 198U 1981 1982 1983 1984 19~5
Income
Lamb Levy 1.137
Mutton Levy 6.UU4 0.047 0.491
Interest 0.051 0.072 0.087 0.073 0.073
Profit on
Sheepmeat Trading
-
0.067
Government
Grant 16.413
Board
Supplement 8.6U7
25.U17 7.192 0.119 0.647 0.U73 0.U73
Less
Lamb
24.992 1Supplement
Mutton
Supplement
Loss on Sheepmeat
Trading U.697 59.641 287.919 150.487 357.628
Interest 0.027
25.017 0.697 59.641 287.919 150.487 357.628
Transferred to
Meat Income
Stabil i sati on
Account 7.192 (0.577 ) 0.647 0.073 0.U73 (59.641)(287.919) (150.487) (357.628)
Plus Opening
Balance 7.192 6.615 7.262 7.335 7.408 (52.233) (340.152) (490.638)
Closing Balance 6.615 7.192 7.262 7.335 7.408 (52.233)(340.152) (490.152) (848.266)
Sources: Sheppard and Biggs (1982); NZ Meat Producers' Board (l985)
1 Includes $12.82 m retrospective payment
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3.4.3. Beef
The manufacturing beef and prime beef market prices move in a
similar manner as do the stabilisation prices and SMPs (Figures 3 and
4) •
Prior to the 1978/79 season, the beef price stabilisation
scheme had very little impact, except in 1975/76 when $ll.lM was paid
out. However, during the 1978/79 season, beef prices rose
substantially and there were significant levy collections
(approximately $40 million). For the following season, both the
minimum and trigger prices were raised substantially and payments of
supplements occurred ($9.7 million) in the latter half of the season
following a fall in the market price. The minimum price was increased
for the 1980/81 season and supplementary payments of $d. 5 mi 11 i on were
made. The same minimum price was maintained for the 1981/82 season and
supplements continued at $4.4M.
The SMPs introduced for the 1978/79 season were substantially
above the Board minimum prices, reflecting the Government's desire to
ensure income adequacy, but tney were exceeded by market prices. For
the 1979/80 season. the manufacturing beef (cow) SMP was the same as
the Board minimum price while the prime beef SMP was slightly below the
Board minimum. In the 1980/81 season, the situation was reversed, and
the Government was required to pay 2c/kg or about $1.9M. Therefore,
over the period up to 198u/81, the SMPs were largely ineffective in
ensuring an adequate return to farmers.
In 1981/82 the SMPs were increased sharply away from both the
market price and the Board minimum price. Supplementary payments on
beef totalled $57.1M of which $53.3M was from SMP payments and $4.4M
from the Stabilisation Account. For cows, the level of total
supplements were up to 40 per cent of producer returns. Uuriny the
following year the SMPs ana Board minimum prices were largely
unchangea, but market prices varied widely, averaging well above the
SMPs. Supplements were required early in the season - some $l7.3M in
SMP payments and $0.3M in Stabilisation Account payments - then levies
were applied in April totalling some $2.3M.
SMPs were unchanged for 198j/84 but minimum and trigger prices
were raised. No SMPs were required and stabilisation levies were
collected during July- September, totalling $5.7M. Both minimum and
trigger prices were again raised in 1984/85, and levies of just under
$1M were collected.
The market, stabilisation and supplementary mlnlmum prices for
beef are provided in Figures 3 and 4 and Table 7. The results of the
operation of the stabilisation scheme for beef are reported in Table 8,
while payments to farmers under the SMP scheme are given in Table 6.
Results of the operation of the stabil isation scheme for both sheepmeat
and beef are reported in Table 9.
Table 6: Payments to Farmers Under the SMP Scheme ($M)
COf~~lOD ITY YEAR TOTAL
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85(a}
Lamb 0 0 0 93.9 146.5 213.1 93.8 547.3 N
Mutton 0 0 0 8.7 11.5 48.4 37.8 106.4 w
Wool 0 0 0 184.2 176.7 78.8 0.0 439.7
Sheep Industry 0 0 0 286.8 334.7 340.3 131.6 1093.4
Beef 0 0 1.9 53.3 25.0 0.0 0.0 80.2
uai ry 18.8 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.8
TOTAL 18.8 0 1.9 340.1 359.7 340.3 131.6 1192.4
Sources: Laing and Zwart (1983b); Durbin (1985); Grundy (1987)
(a) payments from a transitional lump sum grant
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3.5 The Livestock Incentive Scheme
In the 1976 Budget, the Government announced a new measure to
increase farm output on the argument that the current economic climate
woul d del ay achi evement of the targetted 25 per cent increase in farm
pr'oduction by lY8S. Under the Livestock Incentive Scheme, farmers who
personally owned stock could elect to obtain either a suspensory loan
of $12, or a tax deduction from assessable income of $24, per
qualifying stock unit as an incentive to increase production by
utilising idle capacity or undertaking a development programme which
permanently increased the total number of stock units carried (NZ
Government 1976, pp. lU-l1). Provided the target increase in stock
units was greater than two per cent and was sustained for the following
two years, and all of the other conditions of the scheme were met, the
suspensory loan was to De written off. In the 1978 Budget, the
Government retrospectively modified the Scheme to allow more producers
to participate by reducing the minimum qualifying stOCK unit increase,
and by lowering the qualifying cumulative percentage increase in stock
units (Nl Government 1977, p.12.). The Scheme was terminated on Maret!
31 1982.
In total, 11.44 million qualifying stock units were approved by
the Rural Bank under the Scheme, which represents 11.1% of the stock
units carried in 1976. Of these 10.7S million qualified under the loan
option and 0.69 million under the tax option. The total value of
payments to farmers approved was $145.6 million inclUding $16.59
million approved under the tax option. Since over 93 per cent of the
qualifying stock units approved were under the loan option, it seems
reasonable to conclude that most properties required additional
development to carry increased stock units.
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Table 7: Beef Schedule, Stabilisation and Supplementary
Minimum Prices, 1975/76 - 1986/87 (c/kg)
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Table 8: Meat Income Stabilisation Account, 1974/75 - 1984/85
Beef Sub Account ($m)
Year
Ended
September 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Income
Levy 0.392 39.726 2.303 5.661 0.987
Interest O.OO!> 0.228 0.064
Government Grant 18.587
Board Supplement 14.282
32.869 0.392 39.731 0.228 0.064 2.303 5.661 0.987
Less
13eef
Supplement 32.833 11.064 0.125 9.722 23.453 4.422 0.270
Interest 0.036 0.352 0.393 0.149 0.110 0.138 0.101 0.049
Other 3.0001
32.869 14.416 0.518 0.149 9.722 23.453 4.532 0.407 0.101 0.049
Transferred to
~Ieat Income
Stabilisation
Account (14.416) (0.518) 0.243 39.731 (9.494)(23.389) (4.532) 1.895 5.560 0.938
Plus Opening (14.416)( 14.934) (14.691)25.040 15.546 (7.843) (12.376) (10.490) (4.920)Balance
Closing Balance (14.416)(14.934)(14.691) 25.040 15.546 (7.843)( 12.376) (10.490) (4.920) (3.982)
Sources: Sheppard and Biggs (1982); NZ Meat Producers' Board (1985)
1 Reversal of credit from Meat Industry Reserve Account
Table 9: Meat Income Stabilisation Account, 1974/75 - 1984/85 ($m)
Year
Ended
September 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Opening Balance
Beef
Sheeprn::·at
(14.416) (7.741)
(14.416) (0.518) 0.243
7.192 (0.577)
(8.075) 32.303 22.882 (0.434) (64.607) (350.631) (495.558)
39.731 (9.494)(23.389) (4.532) 1.8~5 5.560 0.938
0.647 0.073 0.073 (59.641)(287.919) (150.487) (357.628)
N
~
Closing Balance
at Reserve Bank 1 (14.416) (7.741) (8.075) 32.303 22.882 (0.434)(64.607)(350.631) (495.558) (852.248)
Source: NZ Meat Producers Board Annual Reports
1 errors due to rounding
1977 was the first year in which the account was divided into the sheepmeat and beef sub account
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3.6 The Land Development Encouragement Loans Scheme
In the 1978 Budget, the Land Development Encouragement Loans
Scheme was instituted to assist with the development of unimproved
revef'ted land or low producing hill country with the potential to carry
more livestock. Concessi anal loans for 15 year terms to a maximum of
Sl50 per ha were available to cover the initial costs incurred in
aeveloping permanent sown pasture, and provided the improvements were
maintained to the satisfaction of the Rural BanK, the accumulated
interest was written off periodically and only half the principal sum
was repayab·le. A development plan must have been for a minimum of 10
ha or a large enough area for carrying capacity to be increased by at
l";dst 100 stock ,mits (MAF, 19U2). The closing ddte for applications
under the SchemeNds IVlarch 31 191:31. By this closing date, 942,000
hectares were programmed for development. Ttli s represents
approximately? per cent of l~ew Zealan<lls occupied farmland.
By!Viay .i.980, 36l:S3 loan applications totalling ~67.H7 m had been
granted for a total authorised development area of 451,U56 ha and a
planned increase of 2.54 million stock units or 5.6 stock units per ha.
I the year to March 19l:S0, the average total authorised expenditure
paid by the Rural bank was $158 per ha, or $29 per stock unit, which
contributed some 41 per cent of the total development expenditure
(!-\skwi th 1980).
The effect of the LO£LS and LIS (and SMP) was a substantial
increase in pastoral sector production, particularly of sheepmeats
(Table 10). Between 1978 and 19H2 breeding ewe numbers increased by
more than six million (14 per cent) while cow numbers fell. Mutton and
lamb production rose by 127 kt or 25 per cent during this five year
period.
Table 10: Pastoral Sector Production 1970/71 - 1986/87
Breeding Breeding Milkfat Processed
Ewes Lamb Mutton Beef Cows Beef Wool by Dairy Factories
Year (H) (Ktc.w.) (Ktc.w.) (M) (Ktc.w.) (Ktg.e.) (Kt iY1F)
1970/71 42.9 359 20b 1.5 372 334 244
1971/72 43.0 378 196 1.7 39U 322 258
1972/73 44.1 342 215 1.9 424 309 247
1973/74 41.0 304 193 2.0 378 285 228
1974/75 40.4 331 164 2.0 477 294 244
1975/76 41.1 356 155 2.3 599 312 268
1976/77 41.2 340 156 2.2 530 302 275
1977/78 42.8 336 160 2.2 534 311 251
1978/79 44.5 350 163 2.1 491 321 274 (.oJ.....
1979/80 46.1 383 169 1.9 479 357 291
1980/81 48.2 426 201 1.8 481 381 282
1981/82 49.j 428 196 1.9 495 363 282
1982/83 50.8 480 20U 1.8 493 371 290
1983/84 51.0 474 194 1.6 419 364 324
1984/85 51.2 498 228 1.4 472 373 332
1985/86 50.2 426 147 1.5 450 358 350
1986/87 47.5 n.a. n.a. 1.5 n.a. 349 301
Sources: NZ Meat Producers' Board
NZ Wool Board
NZ Dai ry Board
NZ Meat and Wool Board's Economic Service
n.a. not available

SECTION 4
THE PIG INDUSTRY 3
4.1 Prior to 1975
Steps to improve the stability and net earnings of New Zealand
pig producers through the operation of some form of government
sponsored body go back over 60 years. The New Zealand Meat Producers
Board, set up in 1922 under the Meat Export Control Act of a year
earlier, included pigmeat within its original area of responsibility.
The Board was primarily concerned with improving the returns to
producers from the exports of meat; as far as pigs were concerned, the
aim of the Board was to overcome the continuing problem of oversupply
on the domestic market.
During the following decade, when pig production and pork
exports grew rapidly, the Oominion Advisory Pig Industry Committee
introduced provisions for a uniform grading scheme established on a
national basis. In 1937 a compulsory levy on all pigs slaughtered was
approved by the Government to provide funds for the establishment and
administration of local pig clubs concerned with improvements in
breeding, and for a system of grading of bacon pigs. These schemes
were administered by a National Pig Industry Council.
After the 1939-45 war, the dependence of pig production on
by-products of the dairy industry as the main source of feed led to the
pi g industry comi ng wi thi n the responsi bil iti es of the Dai ry Board.
However, the gradual emergence of alternative and more profitable
marKets for these dairy by-products resulted in a decline in their use
for pig feeding and the growth of production based on cereals and
non-da i ry protei n feed.
By the early 197U's, the need to provide more specific support
and encouragement to the pig industry led to the establishment in 1973
of the Pork l"1arketi ng Board (under the Primary Products Marketi ng Act
of 1953) and to the setting up of the Pork Industry Council (under the
Pork Industry Act) in 1974.
4.2 1975 to 19~2
A major theme, which has recurred over a number of decades in
discussions on the policies for the pigmeat industry, has been the need
to give producers confidence in the prices which they will receive for
thei r pi gs. Thi sis a problem whi ch is parti cul arly acute in an
enterprise which operates on narrow margins, where a relatively small
decline in prices could wipe out the entire net earnings from pig
production of a considerable number of producers. There has therefore
been a considerable measure of support for a policy which would limit
the effects of market forces on the prices paid for finished pigs,
particularly as the market for pigmeat is one with many sellers but
only few buyers.
3 Most of the material in this Chapter is summarised from Attwood
(1985 )
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Such widespread support resulted in the setting up of the
Committee of investigation into Pig Trading and Marketing (Nordmeyer
1975). The first recommendation of the Report of this Corrmittee was
"tMt pig pr'ices should oe determined by an independent body whose task
should be devoted towards ensuring that producers' costs of production
are fully covered. As a general rule basic price levels should be such
t~at efficient producers rather than inefficient producers are
encouraged in the long run. The R.eport proposed that the "price to be
paid for pigs should be calculated on the basis of the cost of grain
meal" and that "decisions on the price of pigs at various grades could
be made by a three-man committee, one appointed by the (Pork Industry)
Council, one by the processors and one by Government (whO shou 1d be the
Chairman). Such a price fixing body would take into account
differences in costs in different areas and the different grades and
weights at which pigs were being traded".
The framework proposed in the Nordmeyer Report for determining
the prices paid for pigs was not adopted. However, the need to
implement some form of mechanism to limit the consequences of a free
market situation was widely accepted; a scheme to support prices was
therefore introduced in 1977. This "Basic Minimum Price Stabilisation
Scheme" was operated by the Pork IVlarketi ny 130ard in order to provi de a
floor price for pigs. Under this scheme, the Board set a basic minimum
price and was prepared to purchase pigs at that price when the
prevailing market price fell below this minimum level. The minimum
price was set at a level "which would enable efficient farmers to
remain in an economically viable situation" (Pork Marketing Board
1979). The scheme was financed by a levy on each pig slaughtered, and
these funds were used to finance the disposal of the pigs acquired by
the Board. It was envisaged that the majority of these pigs which were
purchased to support market prices would be sold abroad; in practice
the disposal of surplus pigs on export markets proved to be
particularly difficult and. with the exception of a very small
quantity, all the pigmeat purchased by the Board WdS traded back on to
the local market, at a considerable loss. Furthermore this additional
supply had an inevitable impact on the market prices prevailing at the
time of disposal.
4.3 1982 to Present
The problems of operating two separate organisations for the
benefit of the pig industry, and in particular the difficulties which
had arisen from the introduction of the Basic Minimum Price scheme, led
to the merging of the two bodies into one organisation. Thus unlike
producer boards in other areas of farming, that for the pig industry
has gone through a series of major alterations relatively quickly,
reflecting the changing circumstances of the industry and the
difficulty of finding an institutional arrangement that would meet the
needs of producers.
4.3.1. Establishment and Powers of the Pork Industry Board
In 1982 an Act "to consolidate and amend certain enactments
relating to pig farming and pork production and marketing" was passed.
The Act set up a new organisation - the Pork Industry Board which
streamlined the administrative structure relating to the pig industry.
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The Board is essentially representative of pig producers; five
of the nine members are directly elected by producers and the Chairman
dnd Deputy Chairman are elected from those members; a further two
members are appointed by the Minister of Agriculture after consultation
with the producers· elected representatives. The other two members are
appointed by the Minister, one as representative of the Government and
of the interests of consumers of pork and pork products and the other
as representative of the Association of Bacon Curers and Meat
Processors.
Both in its composition and in its functions, the Board is
concerned particularly with the position of pig producers. Its role is
basically to improve the efficiency of pig production, to stabilise the
market for pigs and incomes of producers and to develop more efficient
marketing arrangements. The improvement of efficiency in production is
relatively straightforward; the factors determining production
efficiency are well known and the evidence clearly indicates the very
large improvements that have been made in reducing the costs of
production per unit of output in real terms (Attwood 1985). The Board
has the power lito devise, promote and carry out ll steps to improve pig
production through breeding programmes, research and experimental work
and advisory work.
The development of more efficient marketing arrangements is,
however, much more complex; structural changes in the marketing of
pigmeat, particularly at retail level, have taken place over the past
two decades and there were no immediate contributions that the Board
could have made to such structural developments. Furthermore, there
are no readily identifiable set of factors determining marketing
effi ci ency that can be the subject of a programme of improvement in the
way in which the factors affecting production efficiency have been
identified and promoted.
The Board has the power to promote the sale and consumption of
pork and pork products including the export of pigs or of p;iiieat. It
can also acquire and dispose of pigs or pork other than by intervention
in the market place. The power to intervene in the market place by
purchasing or selling pigs, pork or pork products is subject to the
provi so that such a scheme must be IIpursuant to ;'l sr:'leme of
intervention approved either generally in respect of all ~nterventions
or sped fi cally in respect of any Darti cu1 ar i nter\f\:~{Jti on by th(~
Minister of Finance. 1I (Attwood 1985. p.83)
All of the 15 separate powers of the Board which a,~: specified
in the Act are summarised in the one concerned with ensuring, as far as
practicable, a sufficiency of supply of all c1a ~es of pork and pork
products to meet the full requirements of the New Zealand marKet and tJ
satisfy available economic export markets. This clearly identifies the
Board as having the primary authority in the management of the New
Zealand pork industry, with the responsibility for meeting the needs of
pig producers, pigmeat consumers and those involved in the distribution
and marketing of pork and pork products.
4.3.2. The Board·s Funds and Their Sources
The funds for the vari ous acti viti es of the Pork Industry Boan\
are aisea by a levy on each pig slaughtered on licensed premises (0~
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more strictly by two separate levies). The person primarily liable for
the payment of this levy is the owner of the pig at the time of its
slaughter, in practice the levy ;s charged against the pig producer who
h n1 shed the animal and is deducted from the payments made to producers
for the pi 9S.
The present levy on pigs slaughtered consists of two elements,
,ne to cover the Head Office and Consultancy costs, and the other to
cover the marketing programme. The Head Office and Consultancy Service
accounts also include income from the grant by the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries towards the costs of research, which is
carried out at Palmerston North. The Head Office and Consultancy
Service meets the basic administrative requirements of the Board and
also provides the consultancy service concerned with the improvement in
efficiency in production, Which involves both the direct advisory
services of the Board's technical and field services, and the more
general circulation of information on the further development of
efficiency to producers in the industry.
The marketing expenditure
demonstrations, research, and the
development of a marketing programme.
involves
back up
advertising, promotion,
work required in the
4.3.3, Financial Situation of the Pork Industry Board
The relatively healthy financial position of the Pork Industry
Board is the result of policies dimed at operating all the activities
of the Board at a cost somewhat less than the income arising from
levies on pigs, and from the interest from the funds that have been
built up.
In view of the uncertainties in the market for pigmeat, and
particularly the possibility that the growth in supply will lead to a
d~cline in producer prices, the availability of financial reserves is
essential to fund measures that could be taken to bring greater
stability to the market and price situation. Measures to this end can
involve large expenditures and in the past the lack of adequate
financial reserves had militated against steps aimed at restoring a
better balance in the market for pigmeat.
The surpluses on the current operations of the Board have
enabled it to increase its reserves to over $2.7m (of which $O.9m was
in fixed assets) at the end of the financial year 1983-84.
4.3.4. Policy Objectives of the Pork Industry Board
A producer oriented board, such as that for the pig industry,
is primarily concerned with the net returns that are earned by the
primary producers. Improved profit can be achieved through:
(a) reducing the costs of production per unit of output;
(b) enlarging the total market for pigmeat; and
(c) increasing the average prices received by producers.
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The Board's policy towards reducing production costs is
concerned with i ncreasi n9 effi ci ency; it has powers to intervene in
the pig feed market but it does not use these powers and it is
difficult to see how, in the present competitive situation in the feed
marKet, such intervention would be beneficial. The policy of
increasing efficiency at the producer level has been effective, and the
improvements in standards of performance in recent years have been
evident.
The policy towards enlarging the total market for pigmeat has
also been successful. A comprehensive market development programme has
increased per capita consumption of pigmeat, with the prospects of
additional increases from the further expansion of the current
programme.
It is the third route to increased profits, through steps to
increase directly the prices received for pigmeat, which has given rise
to the biggest controversy. There is a view, strongly held by some
producers, that the Board should act in a price negotiating role, with
the objective of achieving price levels for pigs higher than those
which prevail under the present direct producer/purchaser pricing
arrangements. However, both of the usual mechanisms used to raise farm
prices - direct production controls and market differentiation policies
- face considerable difficulties. It is very difficult to raise prices
paid to producers above those which can be sustained by market forces
on a long term basis.
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SfCnmJ 5
EFFECTS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE PRICE STABILISATION AND SUPPORT SCHEMES
5.1 Anticipated Effects
Price stabilisation schemes operate by withholding payments
from producers in years of high market prices and using these proceeds
to augment producer returns when pri ces are low. Returns may be
sk immed off in vari ous ways. For exampl e. all returns above a tri gger
price may be siphoned into the stabilisation fund. Alternatively. a
percentage of such returns may be withheld or an absolute sum may be
creamed off into the fund.
The objective of price stabilisation schemes is to reduce the
fluctuation in prices received by producers. This is seen to be
desirable. since it has often been argued that price uncertainty can
lead to capital rationing. and that stable prices provide producers
with a sounder climate for planning (Tomek and Robinson 1981).
However. an opposing view is that more savings and investment may occur
when prices. and ultimately it is hoped. incomes, fluctuate, since
producers may direct windfall income gains into investment (Campbell
198L) •
Unstable prices have also been linked to inefficiencies in
resource use. That is, fl uctuati ng pri ces may engender producti on
cycles which in turn means that excess resources may be devoted to
certain commodities during some periods, while remaining underutilised
during others (Tomek and kobinson 1981).
Consumers are generally assumed to prefer and to be better off
under stable prices. Indeed, it is thought that unstable prices may
adversely affect the demand for agricultural inputs, and this reason is
often cited for the gains which synthetics have made at the expense of
wool.
In summary, price stabilisation schemes, are often seen as a
desirable method of maintaining product demand, of improving the
investment climate for producers, and of increasing the efficiency of
resource use.
On the other hand. minimum price schemes are a form of price
support. They can be IIi ewed as a defi ci ency payment, whereby market
prices are allowed to fall to equilibrating lellels with an agency
(usually Government) making up the difference between market clearing
prices and those guaranteed to farmers.
Given that government has decided that producer support is
appropriate, minimum prices tend to be viewed as a desirable method of
doing this. Market prices are unfettered, and producers can make
invesbnent decisions in the knowledge that prices cannot fall below a
certain level. Consumers will also benefit, since price support will
lead to greater output, and hence lower consumer prices, than would be
expected if no intervention had occurred. However, the taxpayers must
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ultimately foot the bill for the decision to support prices, regardless
of the rationale for such support.
5.2 Previous Studies of these Schemes
Laing and Zwart (1983) utilised an econometric model of the
pastoral sector in an attempt to evaluate the short- and long-run
impacts of the removal of the SMP policy. Using 1982 price levels as a
base, they simulated their model ahead for five years for both the
'with SMP' and 'without SMP' alternatives.
In the first year, removing ~MPs would have resulted in
i mmedi ate decl i nes in gross farm income of ni ne per cent and in net
farm income of 20 per cent. There would have been little change in
output or exports, the most important change being a four per cent
decline in lamb exports.
The permanent removal of SMPs would have resulted in impacts
after five years of a 14 per cent decline in gross farm income, d 19
per cent decline in investment and development expenditure in the
pastoral sector, dnd a five per cent decline in foreign exchange
earnings. Additionally there would have been a decline in total stock
numbers of some 4.4 million stock units and a change in the composition
toward beef and dairy cattle, with a corresponding alteration in the
product mix of output and exports from this sector.
Laing and Zwart concluded that " ... SMP payments cannot bejustified solely on the grounds that without them export receipts would
fall dramatically (and) that the productive capacity of the
pastoral sector would not have been seriously run-down in the absence
of SI·IP payments, and woul d have been able to respond to any upturn in
market returns". (p.l.)
5.3 Limitations of These Schemes
The Supplementary Minimum Price Scheme
As described in Section 3.4, the SMP scheme had little impact
on the beef and sheep meat industries from its inception in 1978/79 to
1980/81. SMP's were set at conservative levels and were exceeded by
market prices, except for a small payout on beef in 19~0/81.
However in 1981/82 the SMPs were raised substantially, well
above the current market returns, and this reflected a major change in
objectives for the scheme toward income adequacy. Although income
adequacy had been announced by the Government in 1978 to be one of the
objectives of the SMP scheme, it was apparently ignored in subsequent
bUdgets in favour of price stability objectives. Also as pointed out
by Sheppard and Biggs (1982, p.13) "It may not be inappropriate to
suggest that the relatively high price levels announced for the 1981/82
season (and the sUbsequent season) .•• may have been related to the
political situation at that time, in that 1981 was an election year".
In 1981/82 market returns for sheepmeat and beef had to be supplemented
by between 13-23 per cent. Thus farmgate prices were not only
distorted significantly from the market determined levels (assistance
was opposite to market trends), but there were major changes in profit
relativities between the various pastoral sector enterprises which were
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not reflected in world prices. Desirable adjustments in production
were thereby slowed down or prevented (Rostamizadeh and Bushnell 1984).
The huge payouts made in 1981/82 meant that sr~ps were not increased for
1982/83. This meant an erosion of SMPs in real terms, an impact
contrary to the philosophy of II maintaining li adequate farm incomes which
was used as a justification for the introduction of the Scheme.
Further, the Government stated in the 1982 Budget lilt is therefore
important for the prices set under this Scheme not to diverge
significantly· from the prices determined in international trade over
the medium term" (NZ Government 1982, p.13.). Again then there was a
change in the objectives of the Scheme, with the SMPs applied
inconsistently over time.
Other problems arose from the application of the basic
deficiency payments principle: (a) only some commodities had a
feasible payment system, thus exacerbating the change in relative
profitabilities of enterprises within the agricultural sector; (b)
there were problems with pricing over grades and over seasons (for
example, payment for low priced grades was the same as for the top
grades, thus more assistance was delivered to less demanded products,
and assistance varied widely between years); and (c) for some
commodities all production was eligible (sheepmeats), resulting in
transfers from domestic consumers to producers as domestic prices rose.
A further problem was that, contrary to si mil ar schemes in
other countries, there was no policy rule set down for determining the
level of the SMP, especially when SMPs were set for two years.
Therefore the process was inflexible and there was an inability and/or
an unwillingness to allow farm prices to reflect world market
conditions.
Another issue is that there was no evidence that the bulk of
the variance of farm returns came from price, and therefore that price
stabilisation was an appropriate policy objective. Research carried
out (Chudleigh and Filan 1976; Chudleigh, Blackie and Dent 1976) on
the impact of farm price stabilisation, indicated that while stability
in farm output prices has the potential to assist with macro-economic
stabilisation objectives, the degree of individual farm income
stabilisation was minimal.
Sheppard and 8iggs (1YH2) argued that it is unlikely that the
SlViP scheme resulted in increased output because of the unclear 1ink
between lIincome adequacy II (the stated objective of the SMP scheme at
certain stages of its implementation) and productive investment. This
supposition was confirmed by the empirical research of Laing and Zwart
(1983) .
Finally, implementation of the SMP Scheme provided some
difficulties for trade policy, for it became increasingly illogical to
argue for dismantling protection in the major import markets while
domestic production was being heavily subsidised. The imposition of
countervailing duties by the US on NZ lamb imports was one
manifestation of this difficulty. Thus the visibility of SMP
assistance was very high, and in the circumstances, too obvious in the
end to DotU domestic taxpayers and foreign Governments. Even NZ
producers were opposed to SMP in the last year of its operation.
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ne WZ Meat Producers· Board Price Stabilisation Scheme
The implementation of this scheme was legislated in the 1976
JPdate of the Meat Export Prices Act, with the criteria for setting
mirimum and trigger prices clearly set out. The objectives of the
scheme were also well defined and seemingly remained consistent over
time (Section 3.2). Since it was a stated intention for the Meat
Income Stabilistion accounts to be self-balancing over time, the
minimum and maximum prices had to be responsive to conditions in the
world markets for beef and sheepmeats. There still remained the issue
of accurately estimating the long run average price and of being able
to set reasonably narrow and hence effective price bands around this
average. This uncertainty, and the corresponding desire to avoid
financial embarrassment or unnecessary skimming off, resulted in
relatively wide stabilisation bands which were perhaps a contributing
factor to Government becoming involved in price support programmes
(Uent and Beck 1983).
Many of the problems listed above for the SMP scheme also
applied to the price stabilisation scheme - prices were distorted from
market determined levels; prices were distorted between enterprises;
administrative problems in setting prices over grades and seasons; and
the proportion of total output eligible for supplementation or levying.
It does appear through that these problems were less troublesome than
those for SMPs. The difficulties posed for trade policy remained
however, as did the critical lack of any well-defined link between
price stabilisation and either farm income stabilisation or long term
expansion in farm investment and output.
Finally, where a statutory marketing authority has to operate a
stabilisation scheme with access to subsidised Government finance,
there is the important issue of the financial security of the authority
and the collateral that can De offered. For a buffer fund scheme,
where product is not owned by the author; ty, there is good reason to
suggest that the authority may not be IIbankable ll in a commercial sense,
and this may be an important limitation on the effectiveness of such
schemes.
The Pork Marketing Board Basic Minimum Price Stabilisation Scheme
The operation of the Basic Minimum Price Stabilisation Scheme
for Pigmeat ran into a number of serious difficulties.
(a) it proved to be impossible to sell the pigmeat acquired under
this scheme, either on the external or internal markets, in a
way which did not jeopardise the market balance;
(b) severe financial problems arose in the financing of the scheme,
as producer levies proved insufficient to meet the costs of
supporting prices when these fell significantly below the
minimums that were set. The Pork Marketing Board had set these
prices in the firm expectation that they would receive
financial support from the Government; in practice the support
from the Government was for the principle of a price
stabilisation scheme, with the financing to come from the
producers and not from general taxation;
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(c) it has been held that the sCheme acted to set maximum, as well
as minimum prices for pigs and that "when the 18 month period
over which the scheme operated is taken as a whole, the scheme
had no significant influence on most farm prices for pigs and
acted to depress some farm prices below what they otherwise
would have been ll (Horn 1981). This conclusion must on its own
give rise to serious misgivings about the justification for the
scheme~ even if the other difficulties had not arisen. There
are resource costs involved in administering such a scheme and
these generate no return at all if the scheme fails in its
basic aDjective; and
(d) the decisions on the appropriate rate of levy to fund the
scheme contributed to the problems faced by producers; the
levy was set at a relatively low level before prices fell in
1977 and then had to be increased when pig prices were
depressed. The increase in the levy was required to meet the
cash flow situation which had arisen during periods of high
expenditure from the fund, but this added to the cash flow
problems being experienced by producers.
The problems which arose during the period of operation of the
Basic Minimum Price Stabilisation Scheme were partly due to the
decisions which were made on its day to day operation, and thus would
not necessarily arise if any similar scheme were introduced. However,
as minimum price arrangements of this type have generally experienced
serious operational difficulties, it is unlikely that these could have
been avoided in the case of the Basic Minimum Price Stabilisation
Scheme for Pigs through alternative decisions on its detailed
operation. In the light of this experience, it would seem unlikely
that measures to bring greater price stabiliity through this type of
scheme would be re-introduced. The specific lessons which have been
learned from its operation have been emphasised recently by the more
general tide of current economic policy towards allowing market forces
to have a greater impact on production decisions and resource
allocation. While those responsible for decisions on minimum price
arrangements often have the objective of enabling more rational
decisions on production to be made in the medium term, it is dOUbtful
if'many schemes of this type actually achieve this objective.
A further objection to the basic minimum price SCheme, as
conceived for the pig industry in the late seventies, is that policies
which seek to support farm prices by disposing of excess production on
external markets, while maintaining internal prices above their market
level, have proved to be inimical to New Zealand's general trading
interests when adopted by other states. These policies have been the
subject of strong criticism by various I~ew Zealand interests. In these
circumstances it is unlikely that there would be agreement, either in
principle or in practice, for any price support schemes based on this
procedure.

SECTION 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
During tne early 1970's there were severe fluctuations in the
market returns for New Zelanad's pastoral livestock products. Fuelled
by the oil price shocks and the rapid worldwide inflation in all
commodity prices, wool and meat prices rose sharply during 1972/73.
Then in late 1974 substantial falls occurred in these industries: from
1972/73 to 1974/75, the real price of beef fell ~y two-thirds, the real
price of wool halved, and the real price of mutton dropped some 75
percent. Oue to the important contribution of the agricultural sector
in the New Zealand economy, these farm price and income effects were
quickly passed into the domestic economy. A Farm Incomes Advisory
Committee was established, and recommended introduction of buffer fund
stabilisation schemes for the meat and wool industries. These schemes
were introduced in 1975/76, operated by the Producer Boards.
The Committee also recommended investigation of a deficiency
payments scheme to "maintain an adequate income level". Such a scheme,
the Supplementary Minimum Price Scheme, was introduced in 1978/79
following dissatisfaction with the price stabilisation schemes· impacts
on producer prices and returns.
The implementation of these schemes in the NZ meat industry at
that time could be viewed as being part of a trena toward increased
statutory intervention in the meat industry (as described in Section
3.1), and as part of a move to subsidisation of farm output based on
IIcompensation" arguments in one form or another (Taylor ana Davidson
1986, p. 3) .
Producers and others in the meat industry are interested to
know whether such policies accomplished their stated objectives
(staDilisating or supporting prices, increasing output and export
revenue, maintaining an aaequate income level), and whether this has
been done in a cost effective manner.
It is extremely difficult to determine if the objectives of the
schemes were achieved, because the operation of the schemes was altered
many times as the Government's expectation of the desirea pattern of
prices changed. The stabilisation schemes during 1975/76 1977/78
were expected to provide both stable prices and an adequate level of
farm income, even though the minimum and maximum prices had to be
closely related to market prices; while the objective of the SMP
Scheme moved from income adequacy in 1978/79, to a mure market
orientation in 1979/8U, then back to income adequacy from 1981/82
onwards. These major shifts in Government policy toward the pastoral
11 vestock sector must have made it very diffi cult for producers to make
long term investment decisions in these industries, let alone the
Boards who were charged with implementing the schemes and handling the
product. Rather than introducing a more stable planning and investment
environment in agriculture, these changes in the policy rules may have
induced the opposite.
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Even if it could be suggested that the overall objectives of
the SMP scheme in particular were achieved, the actual implementation
of the scheme resulted in some substantial limitations which would have
to be offset against any benefits of "an adequate income" or "a more
;table planning and investment environment for agriculture". Farmgate
prices were distorted significantly from market determined levels, and
desirable adjustments in production were slowed down or prevented;
some commodities were excluded because they lacked a feasible payment
system; there were problems in pricing between grades and between
seasons; there were inconsistencies between the proportion of output
subject to Assistance; and there was the problem for trade policy
negotiations. Finally there was the argument of Sheppard and Biggs
(1982) tnat there existed only a weak link between "income adequacy"
and productive investment, so it is likely that the SMP scheme did not
result in substantially increased output and export revenue, which was
confirmed oy the empirical research by Laing and Zwart (1983).
For the price stabilisation schemes, many of the same problems
applied, although they appear to have been less troublesome than those
for SMPs. Two other issues are relevant however. First, there was no
evidence that the bulk of variance of farm returns came from price and
therefore that price stabilisation was an appropriate policy objective
(Chudleigh and Filan 1976). Second, even though the objectives of the
scheme were well defined and seemingly consistent over time, and the
criteria for setting minimum and maximum prices were clearly set out,
there still remained the problem of accurately forecasting the long run
average price. The relatively wide price bands that were set made the
stabilisation scheme less effective and perhaps encouraged the
development of the price support program (Dent and Beck 1983).
Perhaps the major criticism of this decade of price
intervention though is the perchant of Governments to expect that
tampering with the price system will satisfy income adequacy
objecti lies. Although the hypothesi s cannot be testea easily, it is
possible to argue that the NZ Meat Producers· Board would not have
suffered the large financial losses of 1981/82 - 1984/85, especially in
sheepmeat (Table 5), if there haa not been the obsession with income
adequacy to be achieved through price support.
Certainly the LIS and LDEL had some impact as well, but the
output of lamb and mutton jumped some 40 per cent between the mid
1970s, when only the price stabilisation scheme was in effect, and
1984/85, when the large supplementation of sheepmeat prices via SMPs
were operative. For example, surely the 40-50 c/kg supplements paid in
1983/84 had some positive influence on sheepmeat supply. Thus the Meat
Board had to accept for disposal during this time, extra output of lamb
and mutton, stimulated by the SMP supplements, and attempt to sell it
on an already very depressed world market. It is little wonder that
trading losses occurred (Table 5).
On the other hand, market conditions in the beef industry were
not as depressed as in the sheep industry, the gap between SMPs and
market prices was relatively small and only for two seasons, and the
beef stabilistion account showed only moderate negative balances and
some positive ones (Table 8), i.e. almost self-balancing as required.
Maybe the sheepmeats account would have shown a similar pattern without
the overlay of the SMP scheme.
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In the NZ pig industry, the calls for price support built up
during the mid 19705 although little was done about it. However since
the profi tabil ity of pi 9 enterpri ses is very sensiti ve to mi nor pri ce
falls - fixed costs are high and most inputs are purchased off-farm
it would seem considerable pressure exists to look closely at
stabilisation and/or support schemes for this industry.
The experience of a decade or more in the pastoral industries,
plus a brief "flirtation with pig price stabilisation, would suggest
this should be carefully done. The objectives of such schemes are not
always well defined or achievable in practice. In addition, there are
difficult decisions to be made regarding implementation and
administration, and there are other undesirable effects. For example,
it is important that pri ce support and pri ce stabil i ty obj ecti ves do
not become entwined.
Since current government policy would not be seen as
sympathetic to any form of price support or subsidisation it may be
appropriate for both the pig industry and the pastoral livestock
industry to exami ne agai n the sources of i nstabil ity in those
i ndustri es, whether the advantages of greater stabil i ty are worth
pressing for, and what simple, alternative mechanisms exist for
generating greater industry stability.
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APPENDIX 1

TABLE A1
Lamb Mid Month Market Prices
(PM 13-16 kg)
c/kg
1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 a 1985/86a 1986/87 a
lctober 56.2 68.4 68.5 90.7 86.5 113.0 124.0 148.5 148.5 202.5 142.0 153.0
lovember 53.2 69.0 68.5 87.0 86.0 114.0 124.0 148.5 148.5 202.5 140.0 170.0
lecember 53.2 80.0 68.3 76.5 86.0 113.0 121.0 148.5 148.5 202.5 140.0 160.0
lanuary 53.2 70.3 66.2 73.5 86.0 113.0 137.0 148.5 148.5 202.5 141.0 162.0
:ebruary 53.2 70.3 66.5 73.5 86.0 114.0 141.0 148.5 148.5 202.5 135.0 164.0
01
I-'
'larch 53.2 70.3 66.5 73.5 93.0 114.0 132.3 148.5 148.5 202.5 139.0 162.0
~pril 55.2 64.9 67.0 75.5 100.0 114.0 120.0 148.5 148.5 202.5 133.0 156.0
1ay 63.0 64.9 67.0 75.5 102.0 115.0 120.0 148.5 148.5 202.5 128.0 153.0
lune 63.0 64.9 72.0 82.5 106.0 124.0 120.0 148.5 148.5 202.5 133.0 153.0
luly 63.0 64.9 74.0 86.5 106.0 122.0 149.0 148.5 148.5 202.5 140.0 n.a.
~ugust 63.0 64.9 74.0 86.5 106.0 118.0 149.0 148.5 148.5 202.5 140.0 n.a.
;eptember 63.0 64.9 74.0 86.5 106.0 118.0 149.0 148.5 148.5 202.5 153.0 n.a.
;ource: NZ Meat Producers' Board
a quoted on an ex freezer basis and not comparable with earlier years
n.a. not available
TABLE A2
Mutton Mid-Month Market Prices
(ML 1 22 kg and under)
c/kg
1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 a 1985/86 a 1986/87 a
lctober 24.0 21.5 42.0 30.5 40.0 59.0 43.0 50.0 50.5 105.5 52.5 74.0
lovember 24.0 24.5 42.0 31.0 40.0 60.0 43.0 50.0 50.5 105.5 62.5 84.0
lecember 22.1 30.5 42.0 30.5 45.0 56.0 43.0 50.0 50.5 105.5 65.5 82.0
anuary 22.0 41.0 35.0 30.5 50.0 56.0 43.0 50.0 50.5 105.5 66.0 77 .0
'ebruary 22.0 46.0 35.0 30.5 50.0 57.0 43.0 50.0 50.5 105.5 48.0 77 .0 (J"lN
larch 22.0 46.0 35.0 34.5 45.0 57.0 43.0 50.0 50.5 105.5 48.0 77 .0
Ipri 1 23.0 46.0 30.0 47.5 45.0 57.0 43.0 50.0 50.5 105.5 48.0 79.0
lay 23.0 46.0 30.0 47.5 45.0 57.0 43.0 50.0 50.5 105.5 48.0 79.0
une 23.0 46.0 30.0 47.5 42.0 51.0 43.0 50.0 50.5 105.5 48.0 71.0
uly 23.0 42.0 30.0 47.5 42.0 51.0 54.0 50.0 50.5 105.5 60.0 n.a.
,ugust 23.0 42.0 30.0 47.5 42.0 51.0 54.0 50.0 50.5 105.5 60.0 n.a.
,eptember 23.0 42.0 30.0 40.0 42.0 43.0 54.0 50.0 50.5 105.5 60.0 n.a.
ource: NZ Meat Producers· Board
a quoted on an ex freezer basis and not comparable with earlier years
n.a. not available
TABLE A3
Prime Beef Mid-Month Market Prices
(PI 240.5-270kg)
c/kg
1975/76 1 1976/77 1 1977 /78 1 1978/79 11979/80 11980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87
October 55.27 55.04 58.46 87.47 128.46 123.00 123.0 147.5 184.5 235.0 170.0 197.5
Noyember 55.27 55.04 58.37 87.47 136.12 130.00 123.0 147.5 184.5 233.0 170.0 197.5
December 55.24 61. 75 58.26 92.44 143.43 130.00 123.00 147.5 184.5 243.0 182.0 202.5
January 55.30 68.72 55.82 108.42 136.42 120.00 123.00 147.5 184.5 243.0 202.0 187.5
February 55.12 68.72 58.77 108.41 136.39 120.50 131.00 147.5 184.5 258.0 187.0 177 .5
March 60.15 62.70 58.73 123.86 127.86 120.50 134.00 162.5 184.5 248.0 182.0 182.5 U'l
w
Apri 1 56.69 58.70 62.76 136.37 112.00 120.00 132.00 175.1 184.5 218.0 157.0 187.5
May 58.19 58.66 69.50 146.37 112.00 120.00 131.00 175.1 179.5 215.0 152.5 182.5
June 57.19 57.10 74.50 124.37 112.00 120.00 136.00 175.1 169.5 215.0 157.5 177 .5
July 55.14 56.99 79.36 123.47 112.00 120.00 143.00 184.5 169.5 220.0 167.5 n.a.
August 55.17 57.40 79.48 108.48 128.00 120.00 143.00 184.5 230.0 216.0 177.5 n.a.
September 55.02 57.47 79.49 123.50 128.00 120.00 143.00 184.5 240.0 215.0 202.5 n.a.
Source: NZ Meat Producers' Board
1 The North Island and South Island mid-month schedules published by the New Zealand Meat Board were weighted
for the total beef slaughter per month per island to derive a weighted average schedule for New Zealand.
n.a. not available
TABLE A4
Manufacturing Cow Mid-Month Market Prices
(M 140 kg+)
c/kg
1975/761 1976/771 1977/781 1978/791 1979/801 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87
October 41.64 42.30 44.88 79.47 106.46 105.00 93.00 126.0 126.0 186.0 146.0 173.0
November 41.64 42.30 44.64 76.47 116.46 113.00 87.00 126.0 126.0 171.0 151.0 173.0
December 41.68 47.32 47.36 85.44 117.45 105.00 86.00 126.0 126.0 191.0 171.0 173.0
January 41.60 49.24 46.92 96.42 124.93 93.00 90.00 126.0 126.0 206.0 191.0 163.0
February 41.90 54.24 49.51 96.41 116.42 83.00 97.00 126.0 131.0 226.0 161.0 158.0 (J'
.j:::i
March 47.43 52.20 49.59 118.36 102.38 72.00 101.00 131.0 151.0 221.0 161.0 168.0
April 44.48 47.20 53.53 134.37 100.00 81.00 104.00 147.5 151.0 196.0 121.0 173.5
May 48.86 50.08 58.24 144.37 100.00 86.00 106.00 144.0 141.0 181.0 128.0 168.5
June 43.66 44.92 60.50 102.37 100.00 79.00 105.00 136.0 141.0 176.0 128.0 166.5
July 41.83 42.64 64.36 101.47 100.00 87.00 125.00 132.0 141.0 190.0 143.0 n.a.
August 41.68 43.72 64.48 81.48 100.00 93.00 125.00 132.U 196.0 168.0 153.0 n.a.
September 42.43 43.92 64.49 101.50 100.00 95.00 125.00 132.0 201.0 166.0 178.0 n.a.
1 The North Island and South Island mid-month schedules published by the New Zealand Meat Board were weighted
for the total beef slaughter per month per island to derive a weighted average schedule for New Zealand.
n.a. not available
Source: NZ Meat Producer's Board
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